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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on the defense of habitation? 
2. Did the trial court deny Appellant due process in 
sentencing by giving inordinate weight to Appellant's prior arrest 
record without sufficient regard for strong rehabilitative factors? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
JOHN FRANCIS McKENNA, : Case No. 860158 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of two 
counts of Aggravated Assault, felonies of the Third Degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103, (1953 as amended). The jury 
found Appellant not guilty of an additional count of Aggravated 
Burglary, a felony of the First Degree, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended) at a trial which occurred October 
21 and 22, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
Judge, presiding. On March 31, 1986, after having completed a 
ninety-day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison, Appellant 
was sentenced to two concurrent 0-5 year terms of incarceration. 
Statement of Facts 
The information in the instant case alleged John McKenna 
had committed aggravated burglary by entering or remaining 
unlawfully in his estranged wifefs residence with the intent to 
assault her or one Steve Lujan, her new lover, and threatening the 
immediate use of a firearm against them. The aggravated assault 
charges alleged defendant assaulted his wife and Mr. Lujan by 
threatening to do bodily injury to them accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, by the use of a firearm. 
On the morning of August 21, 1985, around 7:00 a.m., John 
McKenna came to the home of his wife and children to invite them to 
attend a movie with him later in the evening (T. 96). When he was 
greeted at the door by Carol McKenna, who was unkempt and naked 
under a partially open robe (T. 99), he discovered that a stranger 
was in the home (T. 96). Upon realizing another male was present in 
the home under these circumstances, Appellant went to his truck for 
his pistol (T. 98) intending to "eject the person from my house and 
from my children" (T. 99). Mr. McKenna then entered the home and 
used force to eject Mr. Lujan (T. 11, 103). 
Immediately after Mr. McKenna ejected Mr. Lujan, Mr. and 
Mrs. McKenna began fighting (T. 12, 106). Appellant testified that 
as he stood in the living room watching for Mr. Lujan, Carol McKenna 
came at him from behind, swinging, slapping and punching him with 
her fists and open hands, yelling about chasing Mr. Lujan out (T. 
106, 127). Carol McKenna admitted that she might have swung at and 
hit the Appellant (T. 45-46). She also testified that the fight 
went on for ten to fifteen minutes (T. 12) and that both parties 
were loud and upset (T. 45). The reminder of her testimony 
concerning the fight focused primarily upon the actions of the 
Appellant. She testified that the Appellant hit her in the head a 
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number of times with the gun and said he would kill her (T. 12). He 
kicked her in the stomach and pushed her onto the couch (T. 13). 
Appellant testified that as Ms. McKenna came at him, he could not 
see whether she had a weapon, but she approached from the kitchen 
where there were knives, and she owned other firearms (T. 127-128). 
Appellant pointed the gun at her with his right hand as she 
attacked, then struck her with his left hand and hit her three or 
four times in all (T. 107-108, 127-128). 
While the parties were fighting each other, Mrs. McKenna 
was shot in the shoulder (T. 16, 110). Testimony as to how the 
actual shooting occurred conflicted. Carol McKenna testified that 
after the Appellant pushed her onto the couch, he pointed the gun at 
her face (T 13). She slapped at Appellant's right arm, which held 
the gun, with her right arm in a left to right motion across her 
body, striking his right arm on the inside of the forearm as the gun 
was fired (T. 15, 42-43). She was shot in the shoulder (T. 16). 
She testified that Appellant then laid on the floor, put the gun to 
his head and stated he would kill himself (T. 16). She took the gun 
away from him, removed the bullets and placed them in a drawer (T. 
16, 17). Appellant called an ambulance (T. 21). The two then began 
fighting again, at which time Appellant hit Carol McKennafs head 
against the wall (T. 21-22). 
John McKenna testified that he struck Mrs. McKenna as she 
attacked, causing her to fall to the couch (T. 107-108). Appellant 
held her there by pushing her face against the wall as she landed 
(T. 107-108, 129-130). When one of the children climbed onto the 
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couch and said, "Don't hurt mommy," (T. 109) Appellant put the gun 
to his own head and pulled the trigger, causing the hammer to fall 
on an empty chamber (T. 109). As he pulled the trigger a second 
time, Carol McKenna grabbed Appellant's arm with her left arm, 
pulling the gun down as it fired, and was shot in the shoulder (T. 
109, 132). Appellant threw the gun across the room, breaking the 
handle grips (T. 110, 135). Carol McKenna picked up the gun and 
unloaded it while John McKenna called for assistance (T. 110, 134). 
Appellant further testified that he pushed Carol McKenna 
against the wall in the kitchen when she approached him and touched 
him in a conciliatory manner because he was hurt and didn't want her 
"loving me up or touching me anywhere" (T. 110-111, 132-133). He 
had told her to get dressed so no more men would see her as she was, 
and ripped her nightgown when she didn't dress (T. 111). 
The Appellant's defense was that his acts were legally 
justified by the "defense of habitation" and that the actual 
shooting of his wife Carol was accidental. Carol Jeanine McKenna 
testified that she had been married to Appellant for some eight 
years (T. 29) and that they had been separated for five or six 
months on the date of the offense (T. 5-6). She had maintained her 
own residence during the separation (T. 6). The Appellant's and 
Carol McKenna's six- and four-year old daughters as well as two 
older children of Carol McKenna's resided with her since the 
separation (T. 6-7). She stated Steve Lujan lived at her residence 
on the date of the offense (T. 6, 34) and that she shared a bed with 
him (T. 34). She testified she had been naked in bed with Mr. Lujan 
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when she heard a knock at the door at 7:00 a.m. on August 21 and had 
gone to the door in her nightgown to find Appellant there (T. 35). 
She further stated she had continued to reside with Mr. Lujan to the 
time of trial (T. 35). 
Mrs. McKenna also testified that John McKenna visited daily 
sometimes, was allowed to see the children as often as he liked (T. 
30/ 31) gave her some cash support, bought food for the household 
(T. 31), and slept there in a bed with her on occasion (T. 32). On 
redirect examination, she stated he had stayed with her because of 
convenience for his job and that she was out of town most of the 
time John McKenna was staying at the residence, which was two or 
three weeks before the alleged offense (T. 47-48). 
She stated the Appellant's children were sleeping on the 
living room floor that morning when Appellant came to the door, and 
that only a curtain separated the bedroom she and Mr. Lujan were 
sharing from the living room (T. 51-52). 
John McKenna testified that he visited his wife and 
children almost daily, attempting to reconcile the relationship (T. 
93-94). While he resided in the previous home of the family in Lake 
Point, Utah, he had stayed at his wife's apartment for a ten-day 
period in early August, in an intimate relationship, and had stayed 
there at times to supervise the children while Carol McKenna was on 
the road as a truck driver (T. 94-96). He stated he had never been 
denied entry to the apartment when he had arrived unannounced before 
the day in question (T. 96-97), and had been out of town and away 
from the residence for a week or ten days before August 21, 1985 (T. 
97). 
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Because of the nature of the evidence and the defense 
theory of the case, the defense requested several instructions 
concerning defense of habitation, all of which were denied (R. 29, 
30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40) (See Addendum A). 
The jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" as to 
Aggravated Burglary, but convicted Appellant of each of the two 
counts of Aggravated Assault. On December 6, 1985, Appellant was 
ordered to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation at the State 
Prison (T. 209). On March 3, 1986, the Court sentenced Appellant to 
two, concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah State 
Penitentiary (T. 224). From those convictions and sentences this 
appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant, John McKenna, contends that the trial court 
committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the 
defense of habitation. Evidence presented at trial indicated that 
Mr. McKenna was authorized to defend the residence of his estranged 
spouse. Further evidence supported the defense contention that Mr. 
McKenna was acting in defense of the habitation when the supposedly 
criminal acts were committed. The defense was entitled to have the 
jury instructed on its theory of the case. 
Further, the Appellant argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion and violated due process during the sentencing phase 
of the proceedings. The lower court placed too much emphasis on Mr. 
McKennafs arrest record even though most of the arrests did not 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION. 
A. MR. McKENNA WAS AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE TO 
DEFEND THE HABITATION OF HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-405 (1953, as amended) reads as 
follows: 
Force in defense of habitation. (1) A person 
is justified in using force against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation; 
however, he is justified in the use of force 
which is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he 
reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling, or being in the 
habitation and he reasonably believes that the 
force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry 
is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony in the habitation and that 
the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in 
defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to 
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry 
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of 
force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
or surreptitiously or by stealth or for the 
purpose of committing a felony. 
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Under Sections 1(b) and 2 of the statute, the Appellant was 
justified in using the force he considered necessary, including 
deadly force, to terminate the commission of a felony within a 
habitation he was authorized to defend. Mr. McKenna contends that 
inasmuch as Mr. Lujan was cohabitating with McKenna's wife, thus 
committing the felony of Bigamy, he was authorized to use the force 
he did to eject Mr. Lujan from the home of his wife and children. 
In order to invoke the protection of the statute, clearly 
one must be authorized to defend the habitation. As established in 
the record, and given the Court's interpretation of a similar but 
more restrictive statute in State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1977), Mr. McKenna was authorized to use force to terminate a felony 
within this home. 
At the time of the incident, Mr. McKenna had been separated 
from his wife of eight years for approximately five months (T. 6, 
29). Although his wife had established her own residence, Mr. 
McKenna was a frequent guest, had taken meals there, had slept there 
and was always welcome (T. 29-32). 
On the morning of August 21, 1985, after returning from a 
ten-day hunting trip, Mr. McKenna went to the home of his family to 
invite them to a movie later that evening (T. 96). While at the 
door, he discovered his naked wife partially covered by a robe while 
a stranger was in the house (T. 96, 99). Knowing his children to be 
in the home and not sure what to expect, he armed himself, 
reasonably believing that there was a possibility of danger. After 
discovering Mr. Lujan on his wife's bed, Mr. McKenna ejected him 
from the home (T. 98-104). 
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That Mr. McKenna was authorized to use force in defense of 
the home of his wife and children is strongly supported by State v. 
Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). In that case, this Court held 
that the Defense of Habitation statute "should be interpreted and 
applied in the broad sense" and would thus "include not only a 
person's actual residence, but whatever place he may be occupying 
peacefully as a substitute home or habitation, such as a hotel, 
motel, or even where he is a guest in the home of another." 
Mitcheson at 1122. In Mitcheson the defendant merely visited his 
sister's home for the purpose of participating in a poker game. 
Mitcheson at 1121. This Court held that this was enough to 
authorize him to defend the habitation with deadly force, even under 
the more restrictive statute then in effect. (See Addendum B). 
After Mitcheson was decided, the legislature expanded the 
scope of the defense of habitation statute. The legislature added a 
presumption of law that any force used is reasonable if used to 
prevent or terminate the commission of any felony within the 
habitation. (See Addendum C). This amendment is a deliberate, 
unambiguous expansion of the "man's home is his castle" doctrine 
which is reflective of this state's cultural and social values. In 
response to these values, the legislature clarified and simplified 
its intention. Simply, if a person such as Mr. Lujan, enters the 
habitation for the purpose of committing any felony, any force used 
to terminate that felony is presumed to be reasonable. 
In the instant case, the Appellant, Mr. McKenna, was 
defending the home of his wife and children, a home in which he 
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actually lived for a period prior to his hunting trip (T. 94), a 
home in which he frequently ate and slept (T. 29-32). His wife 
testified that he lived there for a period, shared a bed with her 
and acted, with her permission and acquiescence, as a member of the 
household (T. 50-51) • When Mr. McKenna discovered a stranger in the 
home of his wife and children on the morning of August 25, he acted 
in lawful defense of the habitation. 
According to Utah Code Ann. §76-7-101 (1953, as amended), 
cohabiting with a married person is Bigamy, a third degree felony. 
(See Addendum D). Mrs. McKenna testified that she and Mr. Lujan 
had been living together and shared a bed prior to the incident (T. 
34). Indeed, after the incident they moved together into a new 
residence where they have lived as husband and wife (T. 35). 
In an expansion of previous law, the legislature has given 
the citizens of this state the right to use whatever force is deemed 
necessary, up to and including deadly force, to prevent or terminate 
the commission of crimes the legislature has classified as 
felonies. Mr. Lujan entered the habitation for the unlawful purpose 
of cohabiting with a married person, a felony. Utah Code Ann 
§76-7-101 (1953, as amended). The felony was being committed in a 
habitation the Appellant was authorized to defend. See Mitcheson, 
560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). The amount of force Mr. McKenna used 
against the perpetrator, Mr. Lujan, is presumed to be reasonable, 
inasmuch as it was used to prevent or terminate what was reasonably 
believed to be the commission of a felony within a habitation he was 
authorized to defend. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-405 (1953, as amended). 
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The rule has been established in defense of habitation 
cases that the defender need only "reasonably believe" that a felony 
is being committed within the home. It is not necessary that a 
felony was In fact being committed. State v. Terrell, 186 P.2d 108 
(Utah 1919); State v. Couch, 193 P.2d 405 (New Mexico 1946). In 
Couch, the court noted: "In this class of cases, the authorities 
are practically unanimous that the (defender) need only act on 
appearances, and it is sufficient that if he acts in good faith and 
has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that under the 
circumstances his legal rights are being feloniously invaded..." 
Couch at 411. See also Torcia, Whartons Crim. Law Vol. II, §129. 
In this case Mr. McKenna had reason to believe that his rights and 
those of his children were being feloniously invaded by Mr. Lujan. 
B. THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JURY 
INSTRUCTED REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION. 
This Court, in State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969) 
set the standard for when a jury should be instructed on the 
defendant's theory of the case. The defense is entitled to a jury 
instruction on its theory of the case if any substantial evidence 
supports the theory. Castillo at 620. "Substantial evidence" was 
defined in that case as evidence which is capable of raising a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to whether the 
defendant acted in self defense. Castillo at 620. Also, this Court 
has held that "It is also axiomatic that where the defendant has 
asserted a defense to justify or excuse a criminal charge, and where 
there is reasonable basis in the evidence to support it, the 
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viability of the defense then becomes a question of fact and the 
jury should be charged regarding it." State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 
33, 34 (Utah 1981). 
In this case, a reasonable basis in the evidence existed to 
support the defendant's theory of the case and the jury, had it been 
instructed as to the Defense of Habitation, could have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. McKenna's use of force against 
Mr. Lujan was justified. For this reason, the judgment of the lower 
court as to the assault on Mr. Lujan should be reversed and the case 
remanded for new trial. 
As to the aggravated assault count relating to Carol 
McKenna, the trial court's failure to instruct on the issue of 
defense of habitation may have substantially affected the verdict. 
The defendant was charged with aggravated assault by pointing the 
weapon at Ms. McKenna while threatening to harm her. Although she 
was later shot in the shoulder and there was substantial dispute 
over the parties' actions at the time of the shooting, the evidence 
was clear that the Appellant had pointed the weapon at Ms. McKenna 
initially upon her approach after Mr. Lujan had been ejected (T. 
11-14, 124-127). Therefore, the jury's verdict may have been based 
upon Appellant's initial pointing of the weapon at Ms. McKenna. If 
so, an instruction on defense of habitation would have allowed the 
jury to find Appellant had acted reasonably in carrying the weapon 
into the home to eject Mr. Lujan and that his subsequent pointing of 
it at Ms. McKenna was justified when she assaulted him as soon as 
Mr. Lujan was ejected (T. 106). Without the requested instruction, 
- 12 -
the jury apparently found the threatened use of a weapon against Mr. 
Lujan was unjustified so that its initial threatened use against Ms. 
McKenna also would have been unjustified even if it had found the 
later shooting of Carol McKenna to have been accidental. 
The failure to give the required Defense of Habitation 
instruction, likely affected the jury's evaluation of each of the 
counts and allowed the jury to confuse the factual issues. 
Therefore, the case must be remanded for new trial as to both counts. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FAILURE TO EXERCISE ITS SENTENCING 
DISCRETION BY GIVING INORDINATE WEIGHT TO 
APPELLANT'S PRIOR ARREST RECORD WITHOUT 
SUFFICIENT REGARD FOR STRONG REHABILITATIVE 
FACTORS. 
The due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution requires that a sentencing judge base 
his sentencing decision upon current and reliable information. 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process in Article 
I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution "requires that a sentencing 
judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. Howell, 707 
P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). See also State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1980). 
This Court has held that a trial court has broad discretion 
in considering any and all information that reasonably may bear on 
the proper sentence, so long as due process is not violated. State 
v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986). 
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In the instant case, the trial court abused its discretion 
by giving inordinate weight to arrests which did not result in 
convictions. The record is clear that the trial court considered 
all of Appellant's arrests as convictions at Appellant's bail 
hearing, initial sentencing hearing and final sentencing hearing 
after the ninety day diagnostic evaluation in spite of Appellant's 
and counsel's objections and efforts to correct the "rap sheet" 
listings (10/4/85, T. 3-4, 12/6/85, T. 209, 214-215). By so 
considering the rap sheet arrests, the court assumed Appellant to 
have a much worse record of prior criminal convictions than he in 
fact had. While acknowledging Appellant's rehabilitative efforts at 
sentencing (T. 223), the court seemed to feel compelled to commit 
Appellant to prison because of its erroneous assumptions regarding 
Appellant's prior record, rather than engaging in a careful, 
accurate weighing process required by law. See Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-104(3) (1953 as amended) (Addendum E). 
The conclusion that the trial judge relied heavily upon the 
arrest history of the Appellant to reach his sentencing decision is 
supported by his expression of "grave concern" with Mr. McKenna's 
police record (T. 209). Yet despite defense counsel's explanation 
that most of the arrests did not result in convictions (T. 214-215), 
the trial judge made no indication that he was concerned with 
distinguishing charges that were dropped or dismissed and those that 
resulted in convictions. This conclusion is buttressed by the 
statements of the prosecutor about Appellant's record and the 
reliance by the pre-sentence investigator and the ninety-day 
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diagnostic agent upon Appellant's record as the basis for 
recommending prison (T. 3, 4 10/4/85, T. 218) (See Addendum F, p.3). 
While arrests without convictions may be indicative of 
broad patterns of behavior properly considered by a sentencing court 
(See State v. Faulconer, 613 P.2d 184 (Wash, App. 1980), their use 
as the sole indicator of a need for incarceration is based upon 
legal and logical fallacy. Logically one cannot infer Appellant was 
convicted of each offense for which he was arrested where no 
disposition or a dismissal is indicated on the rap sheet. What can 
be assumed legally is that the application of fair legal procedures 
during which due process can be presumed to have occurred, led to 
one of a myriad of results which was then not formally entered on 
the rap sheet. 
Clearly though, Appellant at the time of these rap sheet 
entries had the occasion to contest the charges if they were 
prosecuted. In fact, many of the entries were dismissed for lack of 
evidence or mistake of fact according to Appellant's statements to 
the court and through counsel. To expect Mr. McKenna could 
re-defend the same allegations in the sentencing forum when they 
have already been resolved in the proper legal forums places on 
Appellant a burden which is logically impossible and legally a 
denial of due process. The State's failure to maintain full and 
complete records when compiling rap sheets is nothing an accused is 
in position to remedy. To insure due process safeguards in such a 
circumstance, requires the court which considers records of arrests 
as well as records of convictions to carefully distinguish the two 
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categories. As for the arrests without conviction, the logical and 
legal conclusions a court could make in the instant case was that 
Appellant had an admittedly long history of alcohol abuse which 
resulted in his coming to the attention of law enforcement officers 
on numerous occasions, in considering Appellant's prior 
convictions, however, the court should have seen that Appellant had 
only been convicted of a felony once when he was a twenty four year 
old, and that he had committed numerous misdemeanor alcohol-related 
offenses over the years. 
According to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-104(3) (1953, as amended) 
the sentencing authority must recognize and carefully consider the 
possibilities of rehabilitation of an individual offender when 
deciding the appropriate penalty. (See Addendum E). As noted by 
this Court, "The sentencing philosophy of the criminal law is that 
the punishment should not only fit the crime but the defendant as 
well." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980). The 
defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
ignoring strong evidence of the defendant's potential for 
rehabilitation and giving inordinate weight to prior arrests, few of 
which resulted in convictions (T. 209). 
Rehabilitation of the offender is a recognized goal of the 
criminal justice system, along with retribution, deterence and the 
protection of society. See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-104 (1953, as 
amended). See also People v. Duran, 533 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1975); 
Cleary v. State, 548 P.2d 952 (Alaska 1976). In many jurisdictions 
the sentencing authority must give as much consideration to the goal 
of rehabilitation as it does to other legitimate established aims. 
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See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970); People v. Cameron, 
613 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1980) . 
At sentencing, defense counsel argued that Mr. McKenna 
showed strong promise for rehabilitation (T. 211-217). His arrests 
were primarily alcohol related (T. 215). His response to the 90-day 
evaluation was excellent. His total hours spent in volunteer work 
in the 90-day unit was extraordinary (T. 211). He was instrumental 
in establishing an alcohol and abuse counseling program for inmates 
in conjunction with the New Start program (T. 210-211). He tutored 
other inmates in reading and writing skills (T. 212). He was an 
enthusiastic participant in group therapy sessions (T. 212). From 
the time of his arrest, he had been found acceptable for inpatient 
alcohol treatment (T. 206). Importantly, Mr. McKenna demonstrated a 
strong desire and ability to change and establish a new direction 
for himself. 
Had the court carefully balanced this record against the 
instant offense which was serious and yet unlikely to re-occur by 
its actual nature and the intense emotional context in which it 
occurred, it would have seen Appellant's need for rehabilitation as 
playing a much larger role in the balancing process. While a true 
exercise of discretion might not prevent a decision to incarcerate 
in many cases, in the instant case such a decision might have been 
reached since Appellant had shown undisputed efforts to effect his 
own rehabilitation after a clearly emotional and sobering family 
tragedy. 
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In considering the sentence, the court gave the impression 
that it found itself compelled to commit Appellant to prison in 
spite of his remarkable rehabilitative progress (T. 209, 210-217). 
The ninety-day diagnostic evaluation recommendation appeared 
similarly compelled in light of its wording and suggestion of an 
alternative sentence. (See Addendum F, p.3, Addendum G, p.2). 
Compulsion on the part of the sentencing authority cannot 
be considered a true exercise of discretion. When it occurs because 
of inaccurate and incomplete information gathered and maintained by 
the State and relied upon by its agents and finally the Court, such 
compulsion violates Appellant's right to due process at sentencing 
and requires remand for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the trial court's refusal to properly instruct 
the jury, the Appellant, John McKenna, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new 
trial. If the Court does not reverse the convictions, Mr. McKenna 
asks that his case be remanded for resentencing in accordance with 
the requirements of due process. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /O day of August, 1986. 
OUL 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DEBRA K. LOY, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this J^ day of August, 1986. 
,o 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendanjd/Appellant 
DELIVERED by 
August, 1986. 
this day of 
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ADDENDUM A 
U b i sn^ ii>03 
DEBRA K. LOY (#3901) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i±&&^ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
JOHN FRANCIS MCKENNA, 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
Case No. CR85-1172 
(Judge Dean E. Conder) 
JOHN FRANCIS MCKENNA, by and through his attorney, DEBRA 
K. LOY, requests that this court in its charge to the jury 
give the following instructions number 1 to , inclusive. 
DATED this 2^\ day of October, 1985. 
J 
DEBRA K. LOY *~~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 
J-\ day of October, 1985. 
i 1/\<A^ K 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the laws of the State of 
Utah do not require a defendant to establish defense of 
habitation by a preponderance or greater x/eight of the evidence. 
The laws of the State of Utah require the defendant to bring 
forward some evidence which tends to show defense of 
habitation. If the defendant has done this, and if such 
evidence of defense of habitation, when considered in connection 
with all other evidence in this case, raises a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in defense 
of habitation, you must acquit him of the charge of aggravated 
assault and aggravated burglary. 
S, 
U v# v# '*- ^  ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has introduced evidence to the effect 
that he believed he was justified in threatening or using 
force against Steve Lujan. 
You are instructed that the laws of the State of Utah 
provide that a person is justified in using force against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that the force 
is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry 
into or attack upon his habitation, however he is justified in 
the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that the entry 
is made or attempted for the purpose; of committing a felony in 
the habitation and that the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
You are instruced that the person usinp; force or deadly 
force in defense of habitation is presumed to have acted reasonably 
and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and 
is made or attempted by use of force, or in a violent and 
tumultuous manner or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the 
purpose of committing a felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If a person acts in defense of habitation as defined 
herein, his acts are called "justified". As defined elsewhere, 
if the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that llr. McKennafs acts were not justified, Mr. McKenna is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
'd 
7> V J -
\j,- '«._; K.Jf v^ >.«••' **& 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Cohabitation is defined as living together as husband 
and wife and the mutual assumption of the marital rights, 
duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married 




A person commits bigamy when, knowing he has a husband 
or wife or knowing that the other person has a husband or wife, 
he purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person, 
Bigamy is a felony under the laws of the State of "Utah. 
'o 
Vjr V* V.*-* v-/v„* ^J 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under the law of the State of Utah, the habitation 
a person may defend includes not only his actual residence, but 
may include also whatever place he may be occupying peacefully 
as a substitute home or habitation such as a hotel, motel 
or even where he is a guest in the home of another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Cohabits is defined as dwelling together, having 
intercourse together as husband and wife, living, or abiding 
or residing together as man and wife. 
> V 
ADDENDUM B 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation.—A person is justified in using 
force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is justified in the use 
of force which is intended or likely to cause death or sex^pus bodily injury 
only if: 
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous man-
ner and he reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the 
purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person, dwelling 
or being therein and that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or " ^ 
(2) He reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for 
the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary 
to prevent the commission of the felony. 
History; C. 1953, 76-2-405, enacted by his castle," from which he may exclude 
Lb 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405. intruders by use of reasonable force, and 
its aim is to preserve the peace and good 
8cope of defense.
 o r c j c r 0f society; therefore, it is to be 
Defendant in murder prosecution, who broadly construed, and applies not only to 
killed decedent after the latter refused to acts in defense of a person's actual resi-
leave defendant's sister's house, was en- dence, but any place he may be peacefully 
titled to raise this section as a defense, occupying as a home or habitation, includ-
notwithstnnding the fact that the sister's ing a hotel or motel room, or the home of 
house was not defendant's own; the rule of another in which he is a guest. State v. 
this section is a codification of the com- Mitcheson, 560 P. 2d 1120. 
mon-law principle that "a man's home is 
ADDENDUM C 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. (1) A person is justified in using 
force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that the 
force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack 
upon his habitation; however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended 
or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
[W] (a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner2 
surreptitiously, or by; stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling, or being [therein] in the habitation and he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of])e*sonal violence; or 
[(3)] (b) he reasonably believes that the entry is. made or attempted for the pur-
pose of committing a felony [therein] in the habitation and that [st*eh] the force 
is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force m defense of habitation is presumed 
for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably and had 
a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry 
or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force, or ]n 
a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by_ stealth, or for the pur-
pose of committing a felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-405, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405; L. 1985, ch. 252, § 1. 
ADDENDUM D 
Marital Violations 
76.7-101. B igamy-Defen^e-Tes t imony . -d ) A person is guilty of 
bigazny when W i n g he has a husband or w?.fe or knowing the other 
person has a husband or wife, he purports to marry another person 
liaVrs with another person. - ° ^ 
(2) Bigamy is a felony of the tiilrd degree. 
(3) It shall be a defense to bigamy that the accused reasonably be-
lieved he and the other person were legally eligible Jo remarry. 
(4) Any person, except the defendant, may be^ compelled to testify 
in a prosecution under this section; provided, however, that the evidence 
given in the prosecution shall not be used against him in any proceeding, 
civil or criminal, except for perjury in giving the testimony. A person so 
testifying shall not thereafter be liable to indictment, prosecution, or pun-
ishment for the offense concerning which such testimony was given. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-101, enacted by 
L. 1973, cfe. 196, § 76-7-101. 
ADDENDUM E 
76-1-101 Purposes and principles of construction.—The provisions of 
tirs code c ' / i l l be construed in accordance with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses ; 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and rcental state which constitute 
e' * & offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault liom condemna-
tion as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to thr- seriousness of 
offenses and which permit recognition or: .differences^^ rehabilitation 
possibilities among individual offerrers. 
(4) Present arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons aecased or 
convicted of offenses. 
History: c. 1033, Te-1-104, enacted by 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 24. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-104. 21 Am. Jur. 2d 97, Crimi^fl Law § 17. 
ADDENDUM F 
°Lzy*?-v 
S W E OF UTAJI 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
N O R M A N H. B A N G E R T E R 
GOVERNOR 
GARY W. DELAND 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
MYRON K. MARCH 
DIRECTOR. FIELD OPERATIONS 
February 25, 1985 
The Honorable Dean E. Conder 
Judge, Third District Court 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Judge Conder: 
69NFJDENTWI 
RE: McKENNA, John Francis 
CASE: CR85-1172 
SENTENCING: March 3, 1986 
Attached is a 90-Day Diagnostic Evaluation Report prepared by the staff of the 
Department of Corrections pursuant to Section 76-3-404, U.C.A., and your Order 
dated December 6, 1985. 
After a review of the available information it is respectfully recommended by 
the Department of Corrections that the defendant be denied probation and 
committed to the Utah State Prison forthwith. 
If the Court desires further information in this matter please contact Charley 










rector, Diagnostic Unit 
DrvrnMiTA r r c n r n r c Du n n i D r r m D 
90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
Date Referred: December 6, 1985 Sentencing: March 3, 1986 
JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE UTAH 
(CITY) [COUNTY) 
NAME: McKENNA, John Francis COURT CASE NO.: CR85-1172 
DOB: 8/12/44 DEFENSE ATTNY: Lynn Brown 
OFFENSE: Agg. Assault, Felony III PROSECUTOR: C. Horton 
INTRODUCTION: 
We have completed our evaluation of John McKenna which the Court ordered on 
December 6, 1985. This evaluation has consisted of clinical interviews, 
psychological testing, a review of collateral information, observation of the 
defendant's functioning at the Diagnostic Unit and case presentation before 
the Diagnostic staff. 
PERSONAL INFORMATION: 
Mr. McKenna is a 42 year old male who was born August 14, 1944 in Elizabeth, 
N. J. He now claims Utah as his legal residence. He was the third of seven 
children born to his parents. Mr. McKenna relates that he got along well with 
his family while he was growing up and does not feel that he was physically or 
sexually abused. He recalls a somewhat mixed childhood environment in which 
to him there were more good times than bad. He was placed in a reform school 
when he was 17 years of age and when released from it, he went on his own. He 
came to Salt Lake City for the first time in 1969 looking for work. He first 
married in 1963 in New Jersey and had two children from that marriage, both of 
whom are now adults. He and his first wife separated after a few years, 
although the divorce was not final until 1975. He married his current wife in 
1977 in Salt Lake City and had two children from this marriage. He and his 
wife have separated on occasion because of fighting. With respect to 
education, Mr. McKenna received his GED in the reformatory in New Jersey. He 
has some additional education from a technical college. He has never served 
in any branch of the military service. 
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CRITICAL AREAS: 
1) Antisocial Personality Disorder and Personality Disorder-Assaultive or 
Explosive Person: Testing and ooservation of Mr. McKenna during his 
Diagnostic evaluation show him to have a serious Antisocial 
Personality Disorder as well as a very serious Assaultive Personality 
Disorder. According to Dr. Don Long, clinical psychologist for the 
Department of Corrections, Mr. McKenna is extroverted, overactive, 
impulsive, and rather irresponsible. He is hostile, socially shallow, 
and superficial. He has fluctuating morals and poor conscience 
development. According to Dr. Long, he continually lacks restraint, 
control, and judgment. He has poor internal controls with neglect of 
obligations and he shows flagrant excesses in his search for pleasure, 
self-stimulation, anger and hostility. Again, according to Dr. Long, 
when Mr. McKenna is drunk he becomes very assaultive and this has 
caused him a great deal of trouble. ., 
Dr. Long does not believe McKenna has ever learned to deal with his 
hostility and he feels that he doesn't want to. Dr. Long also views 
Mr. McKenna as a very dangerous person when he is drinking. McKenna 
has a marked disregard for social standards and values and he 
frequently gets into trouble with his environment because of his 
antisocial behavior. Individuals having these particular disorders 
have poorly developed consciences, easy morals, and fluctuating 
ethical values. Alcoholism, fighting, marital problems, sexual 
acting-out, and a wide array of delinquent acts are among the 
difficulties in which they may be involved. They fail to learn from 
experience and are not willing to accept responsibility for their own 
behavior, rationalizing their shortcomings and failures and blaming 
their problems on other people. These individuals have a low 
tolerance for frustration and often appear to be moody, irritable, and 
caustic. These individuals harbor intense feelings of anger and 
hostility. 
Persons with this type of personality disorder also tend to be 
ambitious and energetic, and are restless and overactive. They're 
likely to seek out emotional stimulation and excitement. They are 
uninhibited in social situations and talkative and create a good first 
impression. However, because of their self-centeredness and distrust 
of peopie; their relationships are likely to be superficial and not 
particularly rewarding. They appear to be incapable of deep emotional 
ties and they keep others at an emotional distance. Dr. Long views 
Mr. McKenna as having a poor prognosis for change. 
2) Alcohol Abuse: This agent has seen very few people who have as 
significant an alcohol problem as Mr. McKenna and when one considers 
his antisocial and explosive personality disorder coming under the 
influence of alcohol, it is easy to imagine putting a lighted match to 
a can of gasoline. Obviously, this man should not drink at all and it 
90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION REPORT Page 3 
McKENNA, John 
SENTENCING: March 3, 1986 
is somewhat remarkable that he is still alive after all the years he 
has been drinking and getting into trouble. Mr. McKenna apparently 
oegan drinking when he was about 16, and immediately began 
experiencing problems with the law related to his alcohol abuse. He 
apparently has been involved in outpatient alcohol treatment in the 
past, once in 1975, and again in 1982 when he voluntarily entered The 
First Step House treatment center. However, he seems to have gained 
little from these programs. It should also be mentioned that McKenna 
admits to using marijuana on an occasional basis but does not feel it 
presents any problems for him. When he talks to this agent Mr. 
McKenna does not deny that he has an alcohol problem, but it seems 
apparent that he is simply unable to cope with it on his own at this 
time. 
The Diagnostic staff believe that the most appropriate and safest 
place for Mr. McKenna to try to deal with his alcohol and related 
problems would be at the Utah State Prison. Diagnostic staff would 
consider him to have a high probability to reoffend if left to his own 
devices and especially so were he to resume drinking. 
VOCATIONAL ASSESSMENT: 
At the time of the current offense Mr. McKenna was unemployed and had no 
income. His last employment was with Layton Roofing Company, Salt Lake City, 
where he worked as a roofer from 1984 to the time of his arrest—August 1985. 
He has worked for businesses connected with roofing since 1973 and has worked 
for several companies in Salt Lake City as a roofer and as a salesman for a 
roofing company. Apparently his longest employment was for the Layton Roofing 
Company where he worked from April of 1984 to August of 1985, and also between 
1976 and 1982 on a sporadic basis. In talking to him, McKenna indicates that 
roofing is what he has done most of his life. He likes the work and feels he 
makes good money from it. He intends to pursue it again in the future as an 
occupation. It would appear that given Mr. McKenna!s current level of 
intellectual functioning it would be difficult for him to profit from any kind 
of vocational training even if he wanted to. This agent would recommend that 
he continue to pursue the kind of work in the future that he has done in the 
past. 
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: 
Quoting Dr. Don Long, clinical psychologist for the Department of Corrections, 
r0n the Shipley Mr. McKenna received a 98 Vocabulary, 63 Abstract with a 75 
degree Total Score. The difference between the 98 and the 63 is significant 
and is sometimes seen as an indication that organic brain problems have 
already begun. One would need to go further in the testing to find that out. 
His Wide Range Achievement Tests were all in the 70's, so he is functioning in 
the 70fs even though he reads well and puts on airs of education. He claims 
to have gone to college although he only went to the 10th grade. He then got 
one year of college equivalency in the testing and so he feels pretty good 
about that. He has done time in prison before because of assault and 
batteries so he is a very assaultive person, but has managed to live fairly 
normally. There is no evidence which would suggest any brighter or lower IQ 
than he has. In fact, the 98 is more of a maximum than anything else.11 
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PERSONALITY DESCRIPTION: 
Again quoting Dr. Don Long, "Mr. McKenna is described as extroverted, 
overactive, impulsive, and rather irresponsible. He is seen as hostile, 
socially shallow, and superficial, and as having fluctuating morals, poor 
conscious development. Though his social skills appear quite good he 
continually lacks restraint and control and judgment. He has poor internal 
controls with neglect of obligations and he shows flagrant excesses in search 
for pleasure, self-stimulation, anger and hostility. When he is drunk he 
becomes very assaultive and this has caused him a great deal of trouble. He 
is also mildly depressed, pessimistic, worried, and feels very discouraged. 
Although he is full of plans, he has difficulty organizing or implementing 
these plans. He has never dealt with his hostility; he really doesn't want 
to. He has a long history of assaults under the use of alcohol. As long as 
he is drinking he is a very dangerous person so any program planned for him 
should also include Antabuse." 
RESPONSE DURING DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION: 
Mr. McKenna has conducted himself appropriately during his diagnostic 
evaluation. He has presented no problems to staff in terms of management or 
control and he has been cooperative with this agent and his counselor, 
Mr. Perales. Mr. McKenna has kept himself fairly busy during his evaluation 
by participating in various programs at the Diagnostic section of the prison. 
He has been involved in a "New Start" program which is a program that involves 
inmates who have drug and/or alcohol problems. He also has attended groups 
for inmates who are over 30 years of age. In addition to this, he has been 
holding meetings with younger inmates in an advisory capacity. During 
interviews with Mr. McKenna, he indicated that he realizes he has a serious 
alcohol problem and he states, "I!m going to make it. I'm ail for a change. 
I have to straighten myself out. I owe it to myself, my wife, and my family. 
I'jn going to get up. I'm going to make it." 
In spite of Mr. McKenna's apparently-sincere resolution to control his 
drinking problem, according to Dr. Long, it is very difficult for him survive 
without drinking and as Dr. Long has pointed out, when McKenna is sober, he 
puts on a face where he looks more honest, more intelligent, and more aware 
that he does have a drinking problem, only to fall back onto it again. Again 
the Diagnostic staff believe that the most appropriate place for Mr. McKenna 
to address his alcohol and personality problems as well as the safest place 
for the community, is at the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY: 
The defendant is now before the Court for the offense of Aggravated Assault, a 
Third Degree Felony. As already indicated, the Diagnostic Evaluation shows 
that McKenna has some very serious personality disorders as well as a severe 
chronic alcohol abuse problem. Also, of significant concern is the fact that 
he is diagnosed as an explosive person particularly when under the influence 
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of alcohol. Dr. Don Long has indicated that prognosis for Mr. McKenna is 
poor. The Diagnostic staff believe that Mr. McKenna has a significant 
probability of reoffending if left in the community at this time and it is 
Delieved that the most appropriate place for him to deal with his problems is 
within the Prison setting. 
It is therefore respectfully recommended for the Court's consideration that 
Mr. McKenna be committed to the Utah State Prison. For the Court's 
information, McKenna1s case was referred to the Odyssey House staff to see if 
he would be appropriate for their program. In reviewing his case, Odyssey 
House informed this agent that Mr. McKenna was not an acceptable candidate for 
their program because of his past history of violence and his potential to be 





jlSANITA CESPEDES, Ph.D. 
Director , Diagnostic Unit 
eo 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
January 15, 1986 
CLIENT: McKENNA, John Francis DIAGNOSTIC NUMBER: 3774 
DOB: 8/12/44 AGE: 41 
OFFENSE: Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony 
TESTS ADMINISTERED: 
Wide Range Achievement Test, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 
Shipley Institute of Living, Bipolar Psychological Inventory, Sentence 
Completion, Draw-A-Person, Clinical Interview, 
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS: 
Mr. McKenna, a 41 year old, Caucasion male, had a great deal of difficulty 
with alcohol and illegal behavior- He has a long horrendous record. It is 
very complicated Dut, most of all everyone of them has to do with alcohol. He 
looks much older than his age than he anticipated. His face is hardened and 
he looks in his early 60's rather than his early 40's. Even his domestic 
proolems have been because he drank. His present wife finally left him for 
that. She was a victim of the shooting. He finds it very difficult to 
survive without drink and when sober he puts on a face where he looks more 
honest, more intelligent and more aware that he does have a drinking problem, 
only to fall back onto it again. There is no evidence of any physical harm 
done yet, but one isn't sure. He has at least started down the road toward 
being organic and being impaired because of alcohol if it hasn't already 
started. " 
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: 
On the Shipley Mr. McKenna received a 98 Vocabulary, 63 Abstract with a 75 
degree Total Score. The difference between the 98 and the 63 is significant 
and is sometimes seen as an indication that organic brain proolems have 
already begun.. One would need to go further in the testing to find that out. 
His Wide Range Achievement Tests were all in the 70's, so he is functioning in 
the 70!s even though he reads well and puts on airs of education. He claims 
to have gone to college although he only went to the 10th grade. He then got 
one year of college equivalency in the testing and so he feels pretty good 
about that. He has done time in prison before because of assault and 
batteries so he is a very assaultive person, but has managed to live fairly 
ncrmally. There is no evidence which would suggest any brighter or lower IQ 
than he has. In fact, the 98 is more of a maximum than anything else. 
PERSONALITY DESCRIPTION: 
Mr. McKenna is described as extroverted, overactive, impulsive and rather 
irresponsible. He is seen as hostile, socially shallow, and superficial, and 
as having fluctuating morals, poor conscious development, though his social 
skills appear quite good he continually lacks restraint and" control and 
juogment. He has poor internal controls with neglect of obligations and he 
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shows flagrant excesses in search for pleasure, self-stimulation, anger and 
hostility. When he is drunk he Decomes very assaultive and this has caused 
him a great deal of trouole. He is also mildly Depressed, oessimistic and 
worried and he feels very discouraged. Although he is full of plans, he has 
difficulty organizing or implementing these plans. He has never dealt with 
his hostility. He really aoesn't want to. He has a long history of assaults 
under the use of alcohol. As long as he is "drinking he is a very dangerous 
person so any program planned for him should also include Antabuse.-
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION: 
Personality Disorder, Antisocial Type. 
Personality Disorder, Assaultive or Explosive Person. 
Severe Chronic Alcohol Abuse. 
Prognosis: Poor. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
If probation is recommended, he should De put in ATC House along with Antabuse. 
/jas 
L. Donaio Long, Ph.D. 
Clinical Psychologist 
ADDENDUM G 
Defense counsel was unable to obtain a copy of the 
presentence report which is in the possession of the Board of 
Pardons. The report has been ordered to supplement the record. 
